On June 9, 2025, federal agents arrived at a tow yard in Montebello, Calif. in white unmarked SUVs “carrying handguns and military style rifles,” where they found 29-year-old Jason Gavidia, a U.S. citizen, working on his car. After exiting their SUVs, the agents ordered Mr. Gavidia to “stop right there.” After Mr. Gavidia affirmed he was a U.S. citizen at least three times, the agents asked him which hospital he was born in. When Mr. Gavidia did not immediately recall the answer, the officers pressed him against a metal fence, took his phone, and repeated the question. Mr. Gavidia then produced his REAL ID, which prompted the officers to release him; however, the ID he presented was never returned to him after the incident.
Cases like Mr. Gavidia’s have become more common across the United States, particularly in Southern California. In the summer of 2025, several plaintiffs—Mr. Gavidia among them—filed suit against the Department of Homeland Security in Los Angeles County for their treatment during immigration raids. The plaintiffs alleged stops without reasonable suspicion, warrantless arrests for fabricated immigration offenses, and arrests without the officers identifying themselves as law enforcement or the reason for the arrest. The cases were later combined and are known collectively as Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem.
Before addressing the Supreme Court’s ruling in these cases, one must first understand the legal concept of “reasonable suspicion,” which several plaintiffs invoked in their complaints. Understanding reasonable suspicion is crucial because its presence determines which actions police may take when investigating a possible offense.
In 1968, the landmark Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio defined the current framework by which police may stop or detain individuals suspected of committing a crime. The Court’s ruling sought to balance law enforcement powers with citizens’ rights against “unreasonable searches and seizures” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In the end, the Court ruled that an officer may detain individuals briefly based on “reasonable suspicion” that a crime is being, has been, or will be committed based on their present observations. The officer must first be able to articulate these facts, and the stop cannot be based on a mere hunch that illegal activity is afoot. Next, officers must investigate to obtain more concrete evidence that meets the probable cause standard before formally arresting the individual. Finally, if the reasonable suspicion which supported the initial stop disappears, the officer must release the individual immediately. In other words, officers can’t wait around until they find something else illegal to pin on a suspect. If the suspicious facts are gone, the stop must end.
In September 2025, the Supreme Court applied Terry and other cases to Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem and found that stops based on race, language, and place of work were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. In the opinion, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that “reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Among the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion in the cases were the “high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area;” the fact that several of these immigrants gather to work specific low-paying jobs “that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants;” and the fact that many immigrants come from Central America and do not speak English. Justice Kavanaugh also notes that “apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors.”
The Court’s decision is dangerous for our democracy. Justice Kavanaugh claims that race or ethnicity cannot alone be enough to support detention, but the fact that race, language, or occupation can ever be used as a part of reasonable suspicion is terrifying. Reasonable suspicion is simply factual support to suggest a crime has been committed. If ethnicity can support reasonable suspicion, the Court is essentially saying that having a certain skin color makes one more likely to be the perpetrator of a crime.
The best way to highlight the errors in the Court’s reasoning is through analogy. Suppose we determined that German speakers in the U.S. are five times more likely to commit crimes and that people wearing black hoodies are more likely to have committed a crime. Could an officer then stop a German speaker walking down the street in a black hoodie because she is more likely to have committed a crime? Certainly not! Neither the fact of speaking German nor wearing a black hoodie link the individual in this scenario to an actual crime.
The same logical flaw exists for stops based on language and apparent ethnicity. Neither speaking Spanish nor being of Hispanic heritage can positively link an individual to being undocumented, even if many undocumented immigrants speak Spanish and are from Central America. In Los Angeles County, where the detentions in question took place, 48% of residents identify as Hispanic and 38% speak Spanish at home. How could an officer possibly deduce that a particular Spanish-speaking day laborer is undocumented when that description matches vast swaths of innocent people? They simply cannot—and that makes the stops in California completely arbitrary.
Yet, the Supreme Court blessed the actions of the officers in Los Angeles, effectively stripping the protections of the Fourth Amendment from any American citizen who happens to “look undocumented.” The Court’s decision strips away protection for all U.S. citizens by enabling arbitrary detentions based solely on a combination of racial, cultural, and socio-economic indicators.
